Ya’ll know this is all our fault – mine and yours – right?
It’s simple, really. There is a profound dichotomy to the average State fan, a great paradox that makes each of us our own worst enemy: we are intensely loyal…to a fault. As long as we continue to feed this monster, improvement won’t come easy.
We’ve not only allowed the current state to subsist, but even more damnably, we’ve propagated it by donating millions to convert rhetoric into reality. Our administration doesn’t have to be proactive because we’re still giving it our money at record pace.
Make no mistake, I’m pointing at myself here. I’m four years from having my LTRs paid off and I’m unwilling to sacrifice my Section 30 seats and tailgating with my friends to force sweeping changes like many of you did once we grew weary of Mike O’Cain (although I’m quite certain an empty building wouldn’t have gotten Herb Sendek removed in 2001).
We’re a different culture than we were a decade ago, when the discontent and dwindling faith with O’Cain was evidenced by the increasing lack of fan support at Carter-Finley over his final few seasons. Not only was he not beating Carolina, we were averaging 6,648 fewer fans total (note that, like now, Kenan Stadium had a larger capacity). But what should have been more troubling was the fact that with a lower percent capacity, State was averaging 1,488 more empty seats than Carolina, which realistic or not, is the benchmark against which we measure success, right?
At that time, we had not been clamoring for 10-win seasons or New Year’s Day bowls – seven wins each season and home wins over Carolina would no doubt have satisfied a large majority of us at that time. But what O’Cain couldn’t do with seven-win seasons was fill the stadium to capacity each week and increase WPC membership (revenue). As a result, he was unable to create the necessary demand to drive up ticket prices, much less convince boosters to open their pockets to support the athletic department at a time where ambitious expansion plans across the entire program – not just Carter-Finley – were in the works.
The obvious conclusion is that winning will fill the stands. Or perhaps it is nothing more than a basic tenet: fans simply will not open their checkbooks for a guy that doesn’t beat the team they most hate. They will, however, hand over large portions of their disposable income to a guy that convinces them that if they give him their money, good things will indeed happen.
Just the prospect of winning, or even the perception of it, can have a similar effect. Thus, the reason Chuck Amato was such an important hire for State after O’Cain’s dismissal in 1999. While he certainly never delivered on his rhetoric about national prominence, what he did do – and very effectively – was put fans in the stadium and drive fundraising past levels a disgruntled fan base in the 1990s could only imagine. In fact, the more seats we added, the more seats we filled; this surge has even carried over into Tom O’Brien’s tenure, adding further evidence to the importance of having a leader that will no doubt offer a proactive approach to the business of college athletics.
However, in the process of trying to achieve what many term ridiculous aspirations, we built this current monstrosity and now we don’t know how to deal with it. From a financial standpoint, we have an increasingly successful program. And after all, college athletics today is big business, a competitive market of proliferating TV revenues where success in terms of wins and losses is peripheral to success in terms of revenue and market share.
Georgia Tech Athletic Director Dan Radakovich confirmed this after dismissing Chan Gailey in December. According to ESPN.com, he said of the decision: “As far as Xs and Os, Chan is a very good coach. But there’s more to it now. College football is more than just Xs and Os, especially in the competitive market where we are.â€
It’s certainly not for us, as State fans, to judge what any other program deems necessary for their own progress. We define our own model of success and we must invariably respect that each fan base has a unique perspective on how to define its own success. What I find interesting, however, is that a program like Georgia Tech has seemingly refused to accept mediocrity even while mired within it. The fan base’s discontent with the direction of Gailey’s program was evidenced every time they played a home game and there were, on average, nearly 3,000 empty seats (see data below).
Firing a coach with Chan Gailey’s credentials could perhaps be considered a bold move by Radakovich. Gailey never once had a losing season or a losing conference record, and he finished with seven regular-season wins in every season except 2004, when he finished 6-5. He led the Yellow Jackets to five bowl games – six, including the one he didn’t coach in 2007. However, he posted an overall losing bowl record of 2-3 mostly in lower-tier bowls. Moreover, in a 12-game season, seven wins is not the steadfast benchmark of consistency that it once was, particularly now that all seven-win and most six-win BCS teams go to a bowl. By comparison, George Welsh, who defined winning consistency in the ACC, having won at least seven games at Virginia 13 consecutive years between 1987 and 1999, was not even rewarded with a bowl berth for three different 7-4 seasons (1988, 1992, and 1997).
In retrospect, Gailey’s tenure in Atlanta was conspicuous for what he didn’t accomplish rather than what he did. He never lost fewer than five games, played for but never won a conference championship, and never played in a BCS bowl. Most importantly, he never beat Georgia.
The grumbling among the fan base began in earnest towards the end of 2006, when Gailey’s Yellow Jackets ended the season with three consecutive losses to Georgia, Wake Forest in the ACC Championship game, and West Virginia in the Gator Bowl. After Gailey’s sixth season – a winning one – and his sixth loss to Georgia, he was out as the head coach at Georgia Tech.
What Radakovich did was act quickly and confidently, which should prove reassuring to the Georgia Tech fan base that he’s incontrovertibly in control. Must be a good feeling.
By all indications, Gailey was fired because Radakovich demonstrates not only a keen understanding of the big business that is college athletics but he also understands completely what his fan base demands. It has become increasingly evident that the Tech fan base is unwilling – certainly it’s capable – to open its pockets in support of a team that will be nothing more than a perennial seven-game winner; unquestionably one that doesn’t beat Georgia. This is a case where perception is driven by reality.
Although Atlanta may be the home to Georgia Tech, the pervasive argument is that while it doesn’t rival the archetypal SEC atmosphere of Auburn, Baton Rouge, Knoxville, Oxford, Tuscaloosa, or above all, Athens, Atlanta is still very much SEC country, often hosting the SEC Championship; more importantly, the Atlanta media is overwhelmingly pro-Georgia.
Tech faces a handicap in this regard, but it is obviously not a reality Radakovich or the Ramblin’ Wreck faithful show a willingness to accept. This defiance has shown itself on Saturdays for the past few years. Not only could Gailey not defeat Georgia on the field, he was unable to get fans excited enough to even come to the games. Georgia Tech’s apathy is seemingly common knowledge to anyone that has seen the many empty seats – surprisingly, the many empty gold field-side seats – at Bobby Dodd any given Saturday.
Evidenced by the NCAA’s official attendance figures, Georgia Tech simply does not measure up when compared to its chief rival, Georgia. Demand for Georgia football is soaring, while the data suggests that apathy has taken root in Atlanta.
Both Bobby Dodd and Sanford Stadiums have undergone major renovations since 2002. According to GeorgiaDogs.com, the official athletics website for Georgia, Sanford Stadium underwent a total of $33 million in 2003 and 2004 while RamblinWreck.com, the official source for Georgia Tech athletics, reports that Bobby Dodd Stadium underwent a total of $75 million (this figure also includes the Russ Chandler Stadium for baseball). However, only Georgia contended nationally in total attendance during Gailey’s tenure, having ranked fifth on average, behind Michigan, Penn State, Tennessee, and Ohio State from 2003 to 2007 (they ranked just behind LSU in 2002 before Sanford Stadium’s 2003 expansion was complete).
Overall, Georgia Tech not only doesn’t compete in total attendance but struggles also to match Georgia in filling up its stadium each week. On average, Georgia totals 41,466 (83%) more in attendance, which indicates a much greater demand overall for a Georgia football ticket; this is actually quite obvious to anyone that comprehends the cultural difference between SEC and ACC football.
Upon closer inspection of the data, however, the apathy is revealed. During Gailey’s tenure, Tech averaged only 94.5% total capacity, which translates to 2,993 empty seats for each home game, while down the road in Athens, there is a fan in every seat without problems; in fact, Georgia has the opposite problem of demand surpassing supply. While overall attendance at Bobby Dodd is up from 2002 – remember, capacity increased by nearly 21% in 2003 – most telling about the increased apathy of the fan base is the fact that not only did attendance fall each year of Gailey’s tenure after the 2003 expansion, percent capacity fell as well, from 98.7% in 2002 to a mere 91.4% in 2007. This translates to the aforementioned 2,993 empty seats every home game.
Frankly, Georgia Tech doesn’t need a bigger stadium or a larger fan base to be successful; in fact, they have had brief periods of prominence within the past 20 years, having split the national title with Colorado in 1990 (by contrast, Georgia’s last national title was in 1980). What Georgia Tech does require, however, is a fan base that not only fills the seats but also spends its money with more energy.
Radakovich understands this and dismissed Gailey based on his inability to drive Tech fans to do exactly this.
State and Tech are similar in many regards; our cultures are akin and we both experience an inconsistency with local and regional media coverage — most notably, the recent treatment by local, regional, and national medias concerning our coaching situation: Carolina was applauded for replacing Doherty with Williams after three short years of mediocrity while we were villified for “running off” Sendek after eleven years of mediocrity.
But our leadership styles sharply contrast: I have to wonder, had a similar scenario presented itself in Raleigh – say, consistent 20-win seasons, five straight postseason appearances, mediocre fan attendance, a disgruntled and disjointed fan base, and the inability to beat our primary rival – what would Lee Fowler have done?
My guess: absolutely nothing. And then when that change had been unexpectedly forced upon him, he would have proven miserably inept and short of the task.
(For the record, I will go to my grave believing that Rick Barnes would be our coach today had Lee Fowler not handled that search – nothing anyone could tell me, including Barnes himself, will ever convince me otherwise; unreasonable, perhaps, but I am a State fan, after all.)
Watching Radakovich act quickly, assuredly, and arguably smoothly to make necessary changes is perplexing for many of us among a fan base that has endured what we have felt has been an often oblivious while seemingly impervious administration that lags in making progressive changes, preferring instead a reactive approach that often comes long after we have grown exceedingly disgruntled.
Radakovich could likely have been patient for one more year, and it is unlikely he would have come under too much criticism. Instead, he made a proactive decision with the expectation that the next coach will advance the Georgia Tech program before the fans have lost faith. This suggests that while Georgia Tech struggles, they have yet to become complacent with not competing at or above the level of either the rest of the ACC or more precisely, Georgia.
Meanwhile, the party line from our A.D., the local media, and the local talking heads is that we have unrealistic expectations if we think we should ever be able to compete with the storied Carolina and Duke. We’re unrealistic, impatient, and insatiable. Just don’t forget to send in your WPC dues!
We’ve been told to aspire to prominence but just as quickly chastised for having expected it within a reasonable time frame. Shame on us for having unrealistic expectations and shame on us for shelling out millions to make them reality.
Hopefully someone out there has the solution.
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NCAA.com Attendance Data
Georgia Tech 2002-2007 (Bobby Dodd Stadium)
Year……..Official……Capacity…….% Capacity……..National Rank
2007……..50,280……..55,000…………91.4………………..44…..
2006……..50,617……..55,000…………92.0………………..40…..
2005……..51,607……..55,000…………93.8………………..40…..
2004……..52,242……..55,000…………95.0………………..44…..
2003……..52,862……..55,000…………96.1………………..37…..
2002……..43,156……..43,719…………98.7………………..47…..
Totals……50,127……..53,119…………94.5………………..42…..
Georgia 2002-2007 (Sanford Stadium)
Year……..Official……Capacity…….% Capacity……..National Rank
2007……..92,746……..92,746………….100………………..5…..
2006……..92,746……..92,746………….100………………..5…..
2005……..92,701……..92,746………….100………………..5…..
2004……..92,746……..92,746………….100………………..5…..
2003……..92,058……..92,058………….100………………..5…..
2002……..86,520……..86,520………….100………………..5…..
Totals……91,586……..91,593………….100………………..5…..
NC State 2000-2007 (Chuck Amato & Tom O’Brien)
Year……..Official……Capacity…….% Capacity……..National Rank
2007……..56,356……..57,071…………98.7……………….36…..
2006……..56,540……..57,071…………99.1……………….32…..
2005……..52,925……..55,571…………95.2……………….37…..
2004……..53,500……..54,500…………98.2……………….36…..
2003……..53,274……..54,500…………97.8……………….36…..
2002……..49,477……..51,500…………96.1……………….37…..
2001……..49,254……..51,500…………95.6……………….34…..
2000……..46,748……..51,500…………91.0……………….41…..
Totals……52,259……..54,151…………96.4……………….36…..
NC State 1995-1999 (Mike O’Cain)
Year……..Official……Capacity…….% Capacity……..National Rank
1999*…….45,058……..50,500…………89.2………………44…..
1998*…….39,941……..50,500…………79.1………………49…..
1997……..45,939……..50,500…………91.0……………….49…..
1996……..41,328……..50,500…………81.8……………….46…..
1995……..45,292……..50,500…………89.7……………….46…..
Totals……43,510……..50,500…………86.1……………….47…..
North Carolina 2000-2007 (Kenan Stadium)
Year……..Official……Capacity…….% Capacity……..National Rank
2007……..57,417……..59,892…………95.9……………….35…..
2006……..48,857……..59,892…………81.6……………….42…..
2005……..51,667……..59,892…………86.3……………….39…..
2004……..48,000……..59,892…………80.1……………….42…..
2003……..47,133……..59,892…………78.7……………….44…..
2002……..50,292……..59,892…………84.0……………….36…..
2001……..52,583……..59,892…………87.8……………….30…..
2000……..50,500……..59,892…………84.3……………….35…..
Totals……50,806……..59,892…………84.8……………….38…..
North Carolina 1995-1999 (Kenan Stadium)
Year……..Official……Capacity…….% Capacity……..National Rank
1999*…….43,167……..60,000…………72.0………………46…..
1998*…….55,670……..60,000…………92.8………………28…..
1997……..57,650……..57,800…………99.7………………28…..
1996……..47,500……..48,500…………98.0………………30…..
1995……..46,800……..52,000…………90.0………………30…..
Totals……50,157……..55,660…………90.5………………32…..
*In both 1998 and 1999, State vs. Carolina was in Charlotte, which in all likelihood would have been a capacity game for each stadium; Kenan in 1998 and Carter-Finley in 1999.
